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1 Introduction
Decentralization of public service provision has been at the top of policy agendas in numerous coun-
tries over the last decades, involving services such as education, health, public transport and the
supply of energy, water and sewerage systems. In developing and middle-income countries, respon-
sibilities are often handled from a central or regional level down to municipalities1. Such reform
are expected to yield welfare benefits through better local preference matching, higher governor
accountability and increases in the efficiency of service delivery2. Welfare losses may instead derive
from inadequate management skills of local authorities, increases in administrative and coordination
costs, corruption among local bureaucrats or local elites resource capture3. These positive and neg-
ative repercussions may materialize in different proportions across different regions in the reforming
country, giving rise or exacerbating regional inequalities. In this paper I show that entrusting Colom-
bian municipalities with managerial autonomy over local public education has yielded heterogeneous
results on local educational outcomes, depending on the level of municipal development at the time
of the responsibility takeover.
In this empirical analysis I benefit of an unusually clean decentralization criterion: autonomy over
the education service was assigned to cities solely depending on whether they exceeded the 100
thousand inhabitants threshold. This decision rule relieves the analysis from the issues that typically
hinder identification of the effects of higher autonomy: non-random selection into autonomy by local
authorities, and other nationwide phenomena occurring along with decentralization. In this way,
this study introduces innovation to existing literature on the topic. A second valuable aspect of
studying the Colombian case is that it yields insight into a context in which decentralization was
purely administrative, and not mingled, as it often happens, with changes on the fiscal or political
front: managerial authority was transferred, but local taxation and local representation were left
unchanged.
Using panel data on standardized student test scores over a period of 10 years after the reform, I
show that higher autonomy has proven beneficial for highly developed municipalities, but not so for
less developed municipalities. Average test scores in high-developed autonomous municipalities have
started to significantly exceed those of their non-autonomous counterparts, in magnitudes that are
growing over time. Low-developed autonomous municipalities instead appear to be progressively
losing terrain with respect to their non-autonomous counterparts, even though effects are smaller
1Recent examples are the experiences of Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Colombia in Latin America; India,
Thailand, Vietnam and the Philippines in Southeast Asia; South Africa, Senegal, Ethiopia and Uganda in Africa;
Ukraine, Serbia and Bulgaria in Eastern Europe
2On informational advantage and heterogeneity in preferences, see seminal work by Musgrave [1959] and Oates
[1972]. On accountability, monitoring and elections see Crook and Manor [1998], Manor [1999] and Blair [2000]
3Administrative costs are addressed in Breton and Scott [1978] and Panizza [2004]. Corruption and local elites
capture are extensively discussed by Bardhan and Mookherjee [2000, 2002, 2005, 2006].
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and not always statistically significant. Both test score gains and losses seem to be larger for
students with a more advantaged socioeconomic background: they gain more in highly developed
cities but lose more in low developed ones, increasing score dispersion in the former group of cities
and decreasing it in the latter.
In the second part of the analysis, exploring municipal balance sheet data, I show that high and
low developed municipalities implement different spending decisions. Autonomous municipalities of
the upper development quartile invest on local education not only the ad-hoc transfers they receive
from the government, but also add own financial resources to their per-pupil education budget.
Municipalities in the lowest development quartile only spend the education resources they receive
from the central government, or somewhat less. The two groups also show significant differences
in terms of municipal management and law compliance indicators, in directions that are consistent
with the results on student test scores.
The three ways in which this paper adds to existing work in the field are its quasi-experimental
estimation setup, the ability to focus on solely administrative power shifts, and the provision of
suggestive evidence on channels that drive the heterogeneity in outcomes across local development
levels. Implications of the findings may represent relevant references for future public service decen-
tralization reforms to be implemented in low and middle income contexts similar to the Colombian
one, especially in presence of significant subnational heterogeneity in development levels and local
wealth.
2 Selected Literature
Heterogeneity in the effects of decentralization is modeled by Bardhan and Mookherjee [2000, 2002,
2005, 2006], who show how the combination of strong local elites and weak local institutions implies
decentralization to yield under-provision of services to the local poor. Channels for diversity of im-
pacts across places and people are illustrated also in the reviews by Kaiser [2006] and, with a special
focus on developing countries, by Juetting et al. [2005]. These reviews and the vast majority of em-
pirical literature fail to establish any clear link between decentralization and poverty reduction, and
document higher advantages for the rich with respect to the poor in decentralized contexts. Some
studies describe correlations between indicators of local welfare and the spending decisions of local
politicians, but do not establish causal relationships between the two. Reinikka and Svensson [2004]
find that decentralized school grants in Uganda were subject to local elite capture, but less so in
better-off communities. Local governments are found to be more responsive to citizen’s needs when
the electorate is more informed and when better institutions are in place in studies by Besley and
Burgess [2002] on India and Ferraz and Finan [2011] on Brazil. Faguet and Sanchez [2008, 2014] look
at Colombian municipalities’ balance sheet data and construct original aggregate measures of decen-
tralization, then finding negative association between dependence on central government transfers
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and expenditure on education, and positive association with public school enrollment rates. There
are studies that aim at isolating causal effects of decentralization processes at different levels of
local development, but focusing on fiscal decentralization or at contexts in which administrative de-
centralization came along with important fiscal and political changes. Hammond and Tosun [2011]
apply a spatial error model on the US and find that fiscal decentralization (as proxied by govern-
ment fragmentation) led to gains in employment and economic growth for metropolitan counties
but insignificant to negative impacts for non-metropolitan ones. The fixed effects analysis by Zhang
[2006] shows that fiscal decentralization in China has promoted regional inequality, mainly due to
inequalities in tax bases and thus in fiscal burden, and in the development of nonfarm activities
between jurisdictions. Contrary to mainstream findings, Faguet [2004] finds that after a large fiscal
and political decentralization process the poor and marginalized communities of Bolivia benefited
and adapted their expenditure structure to local needs. Closest to this paper in terms of reform
context analyzed and in terms of outcomes looked at is Galiani et al. [2008], who show that trans-
ferring a number of Argentinian schools from a central to a provincial management yielded positive
results in terms of test scores only for schools located in non-poor municipalities. This paper differs
from the study on Argentina in scale of the reform (transferring to local authorities some additional
schools versus the whole education service), in the level of government being looked at (regional
versus municipal), and in the availability of a quasi-experimental setup for Colombia but not for
Argentina4.
3 Decentralization in Colombia and the 2001 Reform
Starting in the 1980s, Colombia has been undergoing a progressive decentralization process involving
governance and administration, fiscal structure, and the delivery of public services; various authors
have looked at the outcomes of these gradual processes, some in a qualitative and some in a quan-
titative fashion5. The reform in 2001 kept the political and fiscal scenarios unchanged and enforced
administrative decentralization6, reallocating local authorities’ responsibilities towards the delivery
of public services7.
4“The transfer schedule was determined through bilateral negotiations between the federal government and each
province” (Galiani et al., 2008, sec.3§3)
5Keeping the focus on education outcomes, Borjas and Acosta [2000], Vergara and Simpson [2001] and Caballero
[2006] comprehensively illustrate dynamics and descriptive trends of decentralizing the public education system over
the nineties, agreeing on generally undistinguished results.
6Sometimes this type of administrative decentralization is labeled as ‘devolution’ in literature, referring to situ-
ations in which the activities of subnational units of government are substantially outside the direct control of the
central government [Rondinelli et al., 1983].
7Educational outcomes of the 2001 reform are explored in the descriptive Colombian central bank report by
Lonzano et al. [2007], who conclude that the post-reform years have witnessed progress in attendance rates but
disappointing results in terms of quality and efficiency. Also Cortés [2010] focuses on the 2001 reform, uses enrollment
data up to 2006 and compares municipalities who gained education autonomy to the remaining, finding that the
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3.1 Pre-reform context and reform motivations
Colombia is currently structured into local authorities as follows: there are thirty-two departments8,
1,118 municipalities located within departments and four special districts (see maps in Section A
in the Appendix). Local authorities enjoy decisional and spending autonomy over a wide range of
matters, although the necessary financial resources chiefly consist of central government transfers
deriving from national tax revenues9. Central government transfers have historically been accounting
for around 90% of the total education expenditure (nationwide average), and the remaining 10%
is contributed by local authorities, with some local variability in these figures (Borjas and Acosta,
2000, p.6; Iregui B. et al., 2006, p.31;Santa Maria S. et al., 2009, pp.19-20). Up to the 2001 reform,
the law had departments and municipalities jointly in charge of public education, entitled to hire
personnel and invest in infrastructure and equipment10; as a result the division of responsibilities
over the management of public education was vague and far from transparent (Borjas and Acosta
[2000]). De facto, being the direct recipients of the bulk of education transfers11, departments were
the primary players on the education sector12. The elimination of any responsibility overlap for the
sake of accountability was one of the main goals of the 2001 reform; further goals were improving
efficiency and reducing waste in the use of public resources, eliminating the yearly fluctuations in
financial transfers, and updating some obsolete distribution criteria13.
3.2 Reform content
Regarding the management of public education, the enactment of Law 715/2001 yielded the fun-
damental change of a clear-cut allocation of responsibility over the service to either municipalities
or departments. Municipalities which counted 100 thousand or more inhabitants in the year 2002
former significantly increased enrollments of publicly subsidized pupils into private schools.
8These represent the regional level, equivalent to “states” in the US, or “provinces” in Argentina.
9Colombia is considered among the administratively most decentralized countries in Latin America, but is fiscally
very centralized (Alesina et al. [2000];Toro [2006]).
10Law 60 / 1993 (distributing competencies across levels of government and assigning resources accordingly), Law
115 / 1994 (the ‘comprehensive education act’), and respective follow-up decrees.
11See Table 1
12For example, departmental payrolls included 85-90% of all public school teachers [Corte Constitucional, 1997,
par.16], and departments decided on their allocation across municipalities. Municipalities were then responsible for
allocating teachers across schools within their territory, and hired the remaining 10-15% that were not on departmental
payrolls [Gómez et al., 2001]. Departments also had the final word on education proposals by municipalities, as these
had to be taken in accordance with departments and under their supervision (Law 60 / 1993). Also see the DDTS
[2004] report, p.6.
13For the official document motivating the reform, see: "Exposición de motivos 715 de 2001 Nivel Nacional",
Congreso de Colombia, Gaceta del Congreso 294 de 2000. For further discussions of this matter see among others
Sarmiento and Vargas, 1997; Alesina et al. [2000]; Borjas and Acosta [2000]; Vergara and Simpson [2001] and the
technical report by DNP [2002].
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became “certified in education” (certified municipalities, from now onwards), meaning responsible
for the public education service on their territories. The education transfers from the central gov-
ernment, which are assigned on a per-pupil base, started to flow into their treasuries. Municipalities
with fewer than 100 thousand inhabitants were not certified, and their public education is run by
the departments they belong to. The next subsection further clarifies the concept of autonomy and
discusses the shift in responsibilities. The forty municipalities certified in 2001 account for around
one third of Colombia’s population and pupil share; their size ranges from 105 thousand to over 2
million inhabitants1415.
The 2001 reform affected not only the education service, but also the provision of healthcare, water
and sewerage and other smaller public services. Nonetheless, it was only for the education sector
that this reform separated municipalities into autonomous and not, and used the 100 thousand
inhabitants rule. Another task performed by the 2001 reform was updating the formulas used by
the central government to compute financial transfers financing local public services; section 3.2.1
below provides further details and discussion on this aspect.
3.2.1 Local authorities’ competencies and transfers before and after the reform
Table 1 summarizes competencies of local authorities before and after the 2001 reform, and indicates
percentages of education transfers flowing to their treasuries.
As illustrated in the table, the reform left the role of the central government unchanged but polarized
both financial transfers and managerial responsibilities of local authorities. From receiving a narrow
share of transfers and being subject to departmental supervision, certified municipalities transitioned
into a situation of full managerial and financial autonomy, while non-certified ones gave up their
already limited powers to the respective departments16. For the rest of the analysis I will consider
certified municipalities as “treated” by the decentralization reform and the non-certified counterparts
as “untreated”, since both figures and anecdotal evidence indicate that a truly substantial change in
regime has happened for the former group but not for the latter. How a violation of this premise
would affect the interpretation of empirical results is discussed in Section 5.3.
The reform also brought an adjustment in the allocation formulas of education resources to local
authorities. In broad outlines, up to 2001 the vast majority of transfers were assigned based on
14See their locations in panel c), Section A Appendix.
15The reform provided for a transition period of two years (2002 and 2003), during which certified local authorities
took over the school infrastructure, started the effective management of the service, and had the opportunity to
reorganize staffing plans on their territories. During these two years temporary transfer amounts were set, and from
2004 onwards the new transfer system became fully operational.
16With only a 3% of total funds still flowing to non-certified municipalities, with pre-set destination. These funds
need to be spent entirely on school infrastructure and school material, according to departments’ directions [MEN,
2003 ; DDTS, 2004, p.7; Law 715/2001, art.16].
6
Table 1: Education responsibilities and transfers by level of government
Central Government
Set school curriculum - Set teacher wages - Set general guidelines - Financial transfers to local authorities
Local Authorities
Up to 2002 (Law 60/1993) From 2002 onwards (Law 715/2001)
Certified Municipalities
Transfers:
84% to department
16% to municipality
Transfers: 100% to municipality
Teacher hiring, training
and placement;
School infrastructure
and materials;
School transport and
any extra education
programs
Departments and
municipalities, under
departments’
supervision
Teacher hiring, training
and placement;
School infrastructure
and materials;
School transport and
any extra education
programmes
Municipality only
Non-Certified Municipalities
Transfers:
97% to department
3% to municipality
Teacher hiring, training
and placement;
School infrastructure
and materials;
School transport and
any extra education
programmes
Department only
(maintenance duties
for municipality)
Author’s illustration, based on Laws 60/1993, 115/1994 and 715/2001 (República de Colombia); Borjas and Acosta
[2000]; DNP[2002]. Percentages are author’s derivation: pre-reform is based on 2001 data in DNP[2002], p.16; post-
reform is based on 2004 data in DNP[2004a] and DNP[2004b]. Percentages for departments include the four special
districts.
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number and seniority of teachers employed, with some adjustment based on number of inhabitants,
local poverty and administrative efficiency. From 2002 onwards the allocation criteria were tilted
towards a student headcount base, but with number of teachers still playing a key role, and again
with some adjustment for local poverty and population density; these changes applied to transfers
to all local authorities, certified and not17. Both before and after the reform, transfers are meant to
be exclusively used for the service to which they are dedicated, administered in separate accounts
and thus not fungible with respect to the remaining revenues and expenses of the local authority
[MEN, 2003].
3.3 Further relevant aspects
3.3.1 Population and population cutoff
The population figures that were used for the 2001 reform were issued by the National Statistics
Office (DANE). The counts were not prepared ad hoc for the reform but issued on the occasion of
the 1993 general census, as forward projections. Certification was assigned to those municipalities
that according to the projections for the year 2002 were exceeding 100 thousand inhabitants. The
cutoff was sharply implemented, and no exceptions were made in either direction; the way population
figures arose allows us to set aside any potential suspicion of targeted count manipulation.
Beyond its use in the 2001 reform, the 100 thousand inhabitant cutoff does not play any significant
role in Colombia’s legislation and it is never used in other matters involving municipal public service
provision. The cutoff appears in the municipal classification that is performed every fiscal year by
the central government. Current inhabitant count and current revenues are jointly used for the
classification, and, given appropriate current revenues, 100 thousand inhabitants may represent the
lower bound for a ‘first’ category city18. This categorization is updated every year and is used for
setting limits to salaries of the mayor, of council members and administrative staff and limits to
general administrative expenditures; the changes are minor across category thresholds. The smaller
municipalities (categories fourth to sixth) are entitled to special support transfers.
Figure 7 in the Appendix shows smoothness of various municipal characteristics around 100 thousand
inhabitants. Most notably, student test scores just before the reform (in 2001) do not exhibit
discontinuities at the 2002 treatment cutoff. If we believe test scores to reflect a range of underlying
municipal characteristics, especially those affecting education outcomes, the lack of discontinuities
17The transition to a transfer system giving more weight to student head-counts should have, if anything, favored
municipalities characterized by low levels of local development„ as such areas have historically been disadvantaged
in terms of teacher provision [Corte Constitucional, 1997, par.19]. Evidence on central government transfers having
become more redistributive over time is presented in Table 15 in the Appendix.
18Law 136 / 1994 and Law 617 / 2000. The seven categories and their relative inhabitant cutoffs are: Special
(500,001 or above), First (100,001 to 500,000), Second (50,001 to 100,000), Third (30,001 to 50,000), Fourth (20,001
to 30,000), Fifth (10,001 to 20,000) and Sixth (10,000 or below).
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in pre-reform scores injects further confidence on the absence of any relevant transitions occurring at
100 thousand inhabitants. Further falsification and robustness tests on these aspects are performed
along the empirical analysis.
3.3.2 Districts and special municipalities
Districts are local authorities whose nature is mixed between departments and municipalities. Al-
ready before 2002, districts were drawing the totality of their financial entitlements for education
directly into their treasuries and managing them autonomously. The four Colombian districts are
Bogotá, Barranquilla, Cartagena and Santa Marta, and they are excluded from the analysis.
There are two municipalities19 whose freedoms on local education policy had been formally enhanced
in 1999-2000, even though the substantial implications of the procedure remained unclear. I exclude
these two cities from the analysis.
4 Data
4.1 Test scores
Colombia has a long running tradition of standardized testing in public schools; ICFES is the
government agency in charge of conducting and assessing the tests across the whole country. The
most complete and frequent test score data refers to the Saber11 examination, which is administered
to all students completing high school20, and which is widely accepted as the reference examination to
evaluate the quality of Colombian secondary education. Saber11 evaluates a range of school subjects;
test scores range from 0 to 100 in each subject and are standardized by subject at the national level,
to a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. This is, each student’s score is informative about
his/her position relative to the national average in that subject. Individual-level Saber11 test scores
are made available by ICFES for the years 2000 to 2012, with information about the school and
municipality to which each student belongs, and some information student background.
4.2 Municipal Development Measures
The development level of Colombian municipalities is being evaluated periodically by government
agencies: relevant data is collected by the National Statistics Office (DANE) and the summative
indicators are calculated by the National Planning Department (DNP). Up to the year 2013, the
19The municipalities of Armenia (department of Quindio) and San Juan de Pasto (department of Nariño).
20This is, students completing 11 years of schooling. The first 9 years are compulsory, the last 2 are optional.
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most informative and widely used indicator on local development was the Municipal Development
Index (hereafter MDI21). The MDI ranges from 0 to 100 and expresses a composite measure of
municipal development; it considers ‘social’ or ‘life quality’ variables such as coverage of energy,
water and sewerage systems, literacy rates and poverty ratios, and ‘financial status’ variables such
as per capita tax revenue and public spending, and dependency on central government transfers;
the higher index value, the better local development. I use the 2001 MDI index to measure the
local development of municipalities at the time of the reform. As can be seen in Figures 1, 5 and
6, size and local development level are overall positively correlated but with high variation at all
size ranges. Municipalities which obtained certification in 2002 had MDI values ranging from 28 to
70; the empirical analysis will use the distribution of development of certified cities to determine
development quartiles.
5 Empirical framework
The aim is to identify the impact of municipal autonomy over the management of local education on
student test scores, especially looking out for heterogeneous patterns that the effect might display
across different levels of local development. The next subsections first introduce and then discuss
the two identification strategies adopted.
5.1 Sharp Regression Discontinuity Design
The fact that in 2001 certification was assigned solely on the basis of the 100 thousand municipal
population cutoff sets the conditions for a sharp regression discontinuity (RD) design. The subse-
quent methodological summary draws on the excellent outlines by Imbens and Lemieux [2008] and
Pettersson-Lidbom [2008], to which I refer for a more detailed discussion of the RD methodology.
Consider the equation (I) Yi = α+ τ Ci+ ǫi , where Yi represents average test scores in municipal-
ity i and Ci is a dummy signaling whether municipality i was certified in education (Ci = 1) or not
(Ci = 0). The consistent estimation of the treatment effect τ is hindered by the fact that most likely
certification Ci is correlated with other municipal characteristics enclosed in ǫi. In our setup though,
we know that the sole assignment rule for Ci was population count Pi, and specifically whether Pi
exceeded c = 100 000 or not, such that Ci = ✶ {Pi > c} where ✶ {.} is the indicator function. In this
case we have that conditioning on population Pi will remove any correlation between Ci and ǫi, so
that treatment Ci is as good as randomly assigned conditional on Pi
22. Thus the ideal specification
21Translation from the original Índice de Desarrollo Municipal (IDM). Data on the index is provided for public use
by the Colombian National Planning Department (DNP - Departamento Nacional de Planeación). A new “Overall
Performance Index” (Índice de Desempeño Integral (IDI)) has been issued starting in 2006 and has now replaced the
IDM (2013 onwards).
22Other ways to express this is saying that the ‘conditional mean independence’ or ‘selection on observables’ or
‘unconfoundedness’ assumption holds, E [ǫi|Ci, Pi] = E [ǫi|Pi].
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of a ‘control function’ h (Pi) is such that its insertion into our equation (I) will completely purge
it from any dependence between Ci and ǫi [Heckman and Robb, 1985]. In practice it is difficult to
guess the ideal functional form of h (Pi) and thus a common approach is to use flexible functions
such as high order polynomials of Pi
23. In order to ensure that τ is capturing only the effect of the
treatment, we also need all other characteristics of the observed units not to change discontinuously
at the treatment cutoff. In our case, we need municipal characteristics other than certification in
education not to exhibit ‘jumps’ at 100 thousand inhabitants, otherwise we would not know which
part of the estimated effect on test scores is due to certification and which part is due to the other
changes happening at 100 thousand inhabitants. Smoothness of municipal characteristics was dis-
cussed in section 3.3.1, and further evidence on pre-reform smoothness of test scores is given through
the falsification tests in section D.
I estimate the model
Yi = α+ τRD Ci + f(Pi) + ǫi (1)
where f (Pi) is approximated by a third oder polynomial in Pi, and interpret τ
RD as the average
treatment effect of certification in education. I then introduce the municipal development variable
Di, expressing the MDI indicator illustrated in section 4.2. Heterogeneity across levels of local
development can be explored either by applying 1 to different subsamples, or by introducing an
interaction term between certification and development, obtaining
Yi = α+ τ
RD
0 Ci + τ
RD
1 Ci ·Di + βDi + f(Pi) + ǫi (2)
where τRD0 +τ
RD
1 Di can be interpreted as the average treatment effect of certification at development
level Di. Section 6 shows the estimation results of 1 on the full sample of municipalities and on four
subsamples split by development of certified cities (upper half and lower half, highest quartile and
lowest quartile), and the estimation results of 2.
Regression discontinuity designs are notably data demanding and rarely free of obstacles (more on
this in the discussion section 5.3). The fact that only forty cities obtained certification in 2002 and
that their population sizes are not all clustered at 100 thousand inhabitants poses difficulties in
terms of available sample size and precision. I am able to reduce sampling variance by using ten
post-reform years of data (2002-2012); including year fixed effects is not necessary in this setup as
the test score outcomes are standardized each year according to the yearly national performance.
Further discussion of the RD estimation is available in Section 5.3.
23This is sometimes referred to as ‘global polynomial series’ estimator. Other estimators of the treatment effect in
a RD setting are kernel estimators, and estimators based on trimming data close to the boundary such as local linear
regression or other nonparametric methods. In a recent working paper, Gelman and Imbens [2014] recommend to
prefer the latter group to the global polynomial method I employ here. These methods are data thirsty and require
high numbers of observations close to the boundary, a luxury that is unavailable in this setting.
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5.2 Fixed Effect Regression on a Discontinuity Sample
An alternative method for estimating the average treatment treatment effect of certification in
education on student test scores is applying the fixed effects (FE) concept, which exploits over-time
variation in the performance of municipalities that acquire certification. The basic FE model reads
as follows:
Yit = α+ τ
FECit +Mi +Tt + ǫit (3)
where test scores in municipality i and year t, Yit, are regressed on certification status Cit, which
takes value 1 in years from 2002 onwards for municipalities who obtained certification, and is 0
otherwise. Municipality fixed effects are Mi and time fixed effects are Tt; the effect of certification
is captured by τFE .
I limit the sample to municipalities with a number of inhabitants close to the certification cutoff,
both from the left and from the right, in order to avoid confounders such as municipal characteristics
varying with population size to threaten identification. Following Angrist and Lavy [1999], I refer
to this as our ‘discontinuity sample’. We are thus estimating 3 on a sample of cities that are similar
to each other in size, out of which some acquired education autonomy (C = 1) in 2002 and some did
not.
For the main specification in the empirical analysis I use municipalities between 80 thousand and 130
thousand inhabitants - which results in a sample of thirty cities, eleven of which acquired certification
in 2002 and nineteen did not24, and whose population counts and development indices are illustrated
in Figure 1 with dark bars and light bars respectively25. Table 2 shows some relevant summary
statistics separately for certified and non-certified municipalities, and highlights the similarity of
the two groups in terms of pre-reform characteristics - including pre-reform test score levels. The
thirty cities in the discontinuity sample account for about 8.35% of the student population enrolled
in primary and secondary school in 201226.
In order to pursue our goal of identifying heterogeneity in the effects of autonomy by levels of local
development, model 3 is augmented with an interaction term between certification status Cit and
development measure Di, obtaining
Yit = α+ τ
FE
0 Cit + τ
FE
1 Cit ·Di + γMi + δTt + ǫit (4)
24Results are robust to extending or restricting the sample; regressions on different samples, including the same
sample used for the RD estimation, are presented in Table in the Appendix.
25Figure 6 in the Appendix shows the two distributions for a wider range of municipalities.
26Author’s calculation, based on enrollment data provided by MEN (Ministry of Education).
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Figure 1: Population and MDI distribution of the 30 municipalities around the inhabitant cutoff
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where the effect of certification at development level Di will be given by the estimates of τ
FE
0 +τ
FE
1 Di.
Section 6 shows results of this fixed effects approach.
5.3 Discussion of identification
As anticipated in section 5.1, the probably most salient difficulty of applying the RD methodology
to the context of this paper is the limited sample size available, which exposes the analysis to both
low power and potentially excessive small sample variation. In fact the confidence levels at which
the null is being rejected in the result section are not particularly impressive27. Moreover, also
cities distant from the treatment cutoff are used for estimation of the RD model28, which relies
on the assumption that the population polynomial f (Pi) is able to ‘control’ for those municipal
characteristics that vary with size and may confound the effect of autonomy on test scores. The less
27The limited amount of available data points also prescribes parsimony in the number of model parameters
to estimate. The parsimonious regression model 1 is therefore chosen for the main specification instead of the RD
approach that leaves two different sets of parameters on the two sides of the treatment cutoff (see Imbens and Lemieux
[2008] for a discussion). Table 17 in the Appendix shows result of the latter method too.
28All cities between 10 and 500 thousand inhabitants.
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Table 2: Municipalities in the discontinuity sample (80,000 - 130,000 inhabitants)
Certified (N=11) Non certified (N=19) Difference
Population in 1992 99,998 73,182 26,816 ***(1,820)
Population in 2002 120,670 91,043 29,627 ***(692)
Population in 2012 127,756 112,305 15,451 ***(3,705)
Municipal Development
Index (MDI) 2001
40.99 40.59 0.40 (1.92)
Unsatisfied Basic Needs
indicator (UBN) 1993
45.18 45.34 -0.16 (0.96)
Saber 11 Math score 2001 40.38 40.45 -0.07 (0.39)
Saber 11 Language score
2001
45.27 45.33 -0.06 (0.62)
Public primary school
gross enrollment rates 2001
0.67 0.67 -0.00 (0.06)
Public secondary school
gross enrollment rates 2001
0.61 0.61 0.00 (0.05)
Standard error of mean difference in parentheses; *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
one needs to move away from the cutoff (the larger the sample close to the cutoff), the more likely
it is that such confounders are properly eliminated. Despite these drawbacks, results display a fairly
stable path across subsamples and are robust to different specifications (see section I.1).
As anticipated in Section 3.2.1, one may hold that the 2001 reform implied not only an increase in
autonomy for the cities which obtained certification, but also some loss of autonomy for the cities
which did not, leading to a certain extent of ‘inverse treatment’ in the control group29. In the case
the reform had induced changes in the education trends of ‘untreated’ municipalities too, both the
regression discontinuity and the fixed effects analysis would be affected through alterations in their
control groups. One would then need reject the interpretation of estimated results as the effects of
an ‘increase in autonomy’ (or effects of decentralization), and rather look at results as the effects of
‘an autonomy gap’ (or effects of authority polarization). These interpretational issues are however
confined to the background as one keeps in mind the primary objective of capturing heterogeneity
in the effect of autonomy across different levels of the local development spectrum.
29For the reasons and context explained in Sections 3.2 and 3.2.1, the author’s assessment is that this scenario
ought not to be excessively worried about.
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6 Results
6.1 Regression Discontinuity results
6.1.1 Baseline results
Table 3 shows estimation results for the regression discontinuity models (1) and (2), on Mathematics
and Spanish student test scores on the 2002-2012 period. In all cases I have excluded from the
analysis municipalities of special sizes, namely those below 10 thousand and above 500 thousand
inhabitants (municipal categories “Special” and “Sixth” - see footnote 18). Column (1) of each panels
report the outcome of model (1). The estimate of the average effect of certification in education on
municipal test scores is close to zero. Columns (2) to (5) of each panel explore heterogeneities in the
effect, considering different subsamples of the 2001 MDI distribution of certified cities: model (1) is
applied to the lower and upper 50% development range and to the bottom and top 25% of the range.
As anticipated in Section 4.2, development quartiles are constructed referring to the distribution of
local development of certified cities. Figure 5 in the Appendix illustrates how in correspondence
of lower levels of this distribution we find a larger number of smaller, non-certified cities. A larger
‘control group’ at low levels of development is what causes low-development sample sizes to be larger
than the high-development ones throughout the analysis.
Looking at the result pattern, a test score gap appears to be opening between the most and the
least developed autonomous cities. More precisely, high developed cities who become autonomous
do better and low-developed cities do worse than their non-certified counterparts30. The effect on
the high developed group is larger and more precisely estimated. Table 12 in the Appendix shows
that in the pre-reform period (years 2000 and 2001 data) this pattern is not visible, and neither there
is any evidence for differential score growth in the different development subsamples. In Section F
in the Appendix I perform formal tests on the difference between pre-reform and post-reform RD
coefficients.
The magnitudes of the effects are sizable: negative 1.5 points (0.15 student standard deviations) for
certified cities in the least developed quartile and positive 2 points (0.2 student standard deviations)
for certified cities in the most developed quartile. The three panels in the first column of Figure 2
depicts these estimation results graphically.
Columns (6) in Table 3 show the estimation of model (2), where certification status is linearly
interacted with the development percentile to which each municipality belongs, as an alternative
way to capture heterogeneity in the effect. This second estimation approach confirms the pattern
30Keeping in mind that test scores are nationally standardized, the post-reform bifurcation could arise because
certified municipalities change their performance and non-certified ones remain static, or the other way round, or a
mix of both effects. Refer to the discussion in Section 5.3.
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previously emerged: the effect of certification is increasing in MDI values, starting negative for low
MDI values and becoming positive at higher ones.
6.1.2 Consolidation over time
After looking at the average effect on scores over the whole post-reform period 2002-2012, I will now
concentrate on years further away from the reform date. Cohorts of high school students taking the
Saber 11 exam in later years have been exposed to the reform for longer31; moreover one should
allow for certified municipalities to gradually implement their medium and long-horizon education
plans. Table 4 shows how the estimated effect on test scores grows in absolute values as model (1)
is run on periods further and further away from the reform date (time periods starting in 2004,
2007 and 2010). Figure 3 uses point estimates and confidence intervals from Table 4 to illustrate
how certified cities in the top 25% development range progressively increase their score gap with
respect to their non-certified counterparts, while the opposite happens for cities in the bottom 25%
development range. Looking at the last period (2010-2012), the point estimates have reached about
a third of a student standard deviation into both directions. In Section E of the Appendix I show
analogous over-time changes in the effect estimations obtained using mutually exclusive year bins
instead of progressively later time periods.
6.2 Fixed effects regression results
The results of the fixed effects identification strategy described in Section 5.2 are shown in Table 5,
for both the basic model (3) and the specification that allows for effect heterogeneity in development
(4). The sample is composed of the 30 municipalities closest to the inhabitant cutoff: 19 non-
certified ones with more than 80 thousand inhabitants and 11 certified ones with less than 130
thousand inhabitants. The outcome variables are municipal test score averages in years 2000 to
2012. The first two columns of each panel refer to the basic model, showing OLS and municipality
fixed effects estimations. The third and fourth column show OLS and fixed effects estimations of the
main specification, using the MDI 2001 as a proxy for municipal development. The average effect of
certification is estimated through the basic model as close to zero and statistically not significant.
The model allowing for heterogeneity across development levels unveils the same pattern that was
detected through the regression discontinuity identification: the point-estimated effect of autonomy
31In the spirit of the exercise performed by Galiani et al. [2008] in their paper on Argentinian school decentralization.
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Table 3: Effect of certification on Saber11 test scores - Main RD estimation
(a) Mathematics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Bottom 25% Bottom 50% Top 50% Top 25% Interaction
Certified 0.17 -1.58 0.40 0.73 2.20∗∗ -2.37∗∗∗
(0.63) (0.99) (0.94) (0.87) (0.86) (0.84)
Certif. * MDI ‘01 0.06∗∗∗
(0.02)
MDI ‘01 0.07∗∗∗
(0.01)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,572 6,536 7,100 472 275 7,561
R-sq. 0.013 0.003 0.003 0.011 0.050 0.084
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
(b) Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Bottom 25% Bottom 50% Top 50% Top 25% Interaction
Certified 0.07 -1.55 0.32 0.52 1.81 -2.11∗∗
(0.66) (1.00) (0.94) (0.90) (1.14) (0.96)
Certif. * MDI ‘01 0.05∗∗
(0.02)
MDI ‘01 0.09∗∗∗
(0.01)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,572 6,536 7,100 472 275 7,561
R-sq. 0.018 0.003 0.004 0.011 0.035 0.123
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
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Table 4: Certification on Saber 11 test scores - progress over time
[ Regression Discontinuity Estimation ]
(a) Top 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2004 Post 2007 Post 2010 Post 2004 Post 2007 Post 2010
Certified 2.37∗∗ 3.00∗∗∗ 3.80∗∗ 1.64 1.36 1.92
(0.92) (1.06) (1.52) (1.09) (1.04) (1.29)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 225 150 75 225 150 75
R-sq. 0.069 0.137 0.199 0.038 0.126 0.137
(b) Bottom 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post 2004 Post 2007 Post 2010 Post 2004 Post 2007 Post 2010
Certified -1.80 -2.23∗ -3.17∗∗ -1.47 -1.61 -2.03∗
(1.12) (1.29) (1.60) (1.02) (1.06) (1.12)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 5,344 3,609 1,809 5,344 3,609 1,809
R-sq. 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.007
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
goes from being between one and two points negative at low levels of development, crosses the zero
threshold at a MDI level of around 45 and grows to reach a positive value of around two points at
MDI levels of 70, as illustrated graphically in Figure 4. These magnitudes are very similar to the
ones estimated with the RD technique for the lowest and highest development quartile32.
6.3 Discussion of main results
Two different strategies have been employed to isolate the effect of local autonomy in the education
service on quality of education, as measured by student test scores, at different levels of municipal
development. Both techniques yielded the conclusion that cities at the upper end of the development
range benefitted from the acquired autonomy while those at the lower end did not, and rather took
32Even though they preserve the qualitative pattern, results for Language are again less imposing, as in the RD
strategy.
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Figure 3: Effect of certification over time
[ Regression Discontinuity Estimation ]
RD estimations of the effect of certification on average Math test scores, for certified municipalities in the top 25%
and the bottom 25% development range (triangles and circles series respectively). Capped spikes indicate 95%
confidence intervals on point estimates.
loss on it, giving rise to a test score gap between the two groups that appears to be widening over
time.
This section concludes with the reflection that the two identification strategies adopted rely on
different assumptions but are shown to yield effect estimations which are qualitatively alike and
quantitatively very similar, which represents a rewarding result on its own. Moreover, the regression
discontinuity design estimates the effect of autonomy for city sizes around 100 thousand, while
the fixe d effects methodology estimates the average effect of higher autonomy across all certified
cities included in the sample33. By comparing the two sets of results, we thus learn that the effect
magnitudes seem to be fairly stable across city sizes ranging from around 100 thousand to around
33In the main results, cities between 80 and 130 thousand inhabitants; in the robustness checks, cities between 50
and 250 thousand and between 10 and 500 thousand inhabitants.
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Table 5: Effect of certification on Saber 11 test scores - Main FE estimation
Mathematics Spanish language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Certified 0.06 0.02 -3.02∗ -3.67∗∗∗ -0.05 -0.01 -1.93 -0.92
(0.76) (0.53) (1.64) (1.26) (0.80) (0.26) (1.64) (0.55)
Certif * MDI ‘01 0.07∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.04 0.02∗
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
MDI ‘01 0.09∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 389 389 389 389 389 389 389 389
N groups 30 30 30 30
R-sq. 0.39 0.67 0.58 0.68 0.38 0.77 0.63 0.77
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses; * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
Figure 4: Effects of certification at different development levels (FE estimation)
500 thousand inhabitants34.
34Considering also the exercises of variation of the sample range that are performed in the robustness checks (Table
19).
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In the remaining sections of the paper the focus will lie upon cities in the highest and lowest quartiles
of the certified development range, as these are the two groups on which significant reform effects have
been identified. The goal will be exploring these effects in further detail and providing explanations
for the test score dynamics found.
6.4 Compositional effects, migration and public-private education
This section addresses the question of whether the over-time changes in test scores purely reflect
changes in student performance (an ‘intensive margin’ result), or whether the pool of test takers
has also been changing as a result of the reform (‘compositional effect’ or ‘extensive margin’). The
pool of test takers may change if we observed responses to the reform such as selective migration
(into or away from the newly autonomous municipalities), switching of students between public and
private schools, or changes in student school dropout patterns. Tables 6 and 7 show regression
discontinuity and fixed effects estimations respectively, of test taker characteristics on the municipal
autonomy indicator (certification status). Characteristics being looked at are number of test takers,
share of female students, share of students whose mother is low educated or high educated, and
the share of students who work while studying. In the RD results, the only statistically significant
pattern we are able to spot is an apparent shift of high-educated families away from low-developed
municipalities and into high-developed ones, which might suggest some degree of selective migration
of the better educated families. Looking at the FE specifications though, at development ranges
which are relevant to certified municipalities (MDI = 29 to 70 approx.), the magnitudes of these
shifts are estimated close to zero. Patterns on low-educated mothers are never statistically significant
and the share of working students does not exhibit changes. Overall it seems prudent to conclude
that with the available data I am not able to pin down any clear and robust compositional effects
on Saber 11 test candidates, as a consequence of the decentralization reform.
The absence of significant compositional changes in the pool of test candidates is in line with what
one would expect after considering two basic facts about Colombia’s school population35. The first
is the significant and persistent gap between the quality of private and public education. Private
schools score substantially and consistently better on standardized tests such as the national ICFES
or international PISA results (Cerquera et al. [2000]; Barrera-Osorio et al., 2012; Gamboa and
Waltenberg, 2011), have smaller class sizes36 and are four times more likely to offer full-day school
programs with respect to public schools, which instead see double the frequency of morning-only
or late hours programs ([Bonilla Mejía, 2011]. In sum, it is fair to say that private education in
Colombia, as well as in the rest of Latin America, is still a privilege restricted to well-off families (also
35In addition to the fact that the publicity of this regime change on mass media has been very limited.
36Approximately 35 students per teacher in public schools and 25 students per teacher in private schools (averaged
over the period 1998-2008). Author’s own calculations using national statistics office education data (DANE C-600).
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Table 6: Municipal certification and test taker characteristics (RD)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N. takers Share female Low M.Ed. High M.Ed. Working
a) All –127.91 –0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
(99.84) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
b) Bottom 25% –262.10 –0.00 0.10 –0.04** 0.01
(163.87) (0.00) 0.06 (0.03) (0.03)
c) Top 25% 81.04 0.01 –0.04 0.10** 0.03
(460.65) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
d) All, w. interaction 185.83 0.02 0.03 –0.05* 0.06
(185.86) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.04)
Certif×MDI‘01 –6.71 –0.00 0.00 0.00* –0.00
(4.79) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mean Y (All) 321⋄ 0.54 0.60 0.06 0.12
N [n. municip.] a) 7,523 [698] 7,523 [698] 4,821 [697] 4,821 [697] 4,829 [698]
b) 6,488 [603] 6,488 [603] 4,158 [602] 4,158 [602] 4,166 [603]
c) 275 [25] 275 [25] 175 [25] 175 [25] 175 [25]
d) 7,512 [697] 7,512 [697] 4,814 [696] 4,814 [696] 4,821 [697]
RD regressions of different outcome variables (in columns) on certification status and a third degree
population polynomial. Cells show coefficient and standard errors on the certification regressor.
The rows refer respectively to: a) All municipalities; b) municipalities in the bottom 25% devl-
opment range; c) municipalities in the top 25% development range; d) All municipalities, with
main effect and development interaction term. SEs clustered by municipalities in parentheses. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. ⋄ The mean of certified municipalities is 1, 947 test takers.
see Gamboa and Waltenberg [2011]for a discussion). The implementation of a reform that shifts
responsibility over public schools from the regional to the municipality level would not be expected
to close the gap between public and private education, or to make public institutions significantly
more attractive to well-off families. The second fact to keep in mind relates to the first: the family
of the typical public-school student in Colombia is less likely to be informed about a decentralization
reform occurring, to form strong predictions about its effects on educational quality, or to have the
means and opportunity to migrate to a different municipality.
6.5 Heterogeneity across people
Along with the heterogeneity in effects across municipalities, heterogeneity across people within
municipalities is a dimension that ought to be looked at. In this section I look at how autonomy
has impacted the dispersion of test scores in cities of the high and low developed group. Moreover,
23
Table 7: Municipal certification and test taker characteristics (FE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
N. takers Share female Low M.Ed. High M.Ed. Working
a) All 31.50 –0.00 –0.02 0.00 0.00
(68.72) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
b) All, w. interaction 128.70 –0.00 –0.04 –0.03* –0.09
(270.37) (0.05) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05)
Certif×MDI‘01 –2.15 –0.00 0.00 0.00** 0.00
(5.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mean Y 971 0.55 0.49 0.08 0.11
N [n. municip.] a) 389 [30] 389 [30] 270 [30] 270 [30] 270 [30]
b) 389 [30] 389 [30] 270 [30] 270 [30] 270 [30]
Municipal FE regressions of different outcome variables (in columns) on certification status. Cells show
coefficient and standard errors on the certification regressor. The rows refer respectively to: a) All
municipalities; b) All municipalities, with main effect and development interaction term. SEs clus-
tered by municipalities in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
I am interested in investigating whether students from different socioeconomic backgrounds have
been differently affected by local autonomy on public education.
Using the self-reported background information on Saber11 test takers, I divide students by social
status as proxied by their mother’s education (ME): low mother education for compulsory education
(9 school years) or less, high mother education is education beyond compulsory. Information on
mother education is available for all years excluding 2005, 2006 and 200737. Table 8 shows estimates
obtained applying our main regression discontinuity model (1) on test score standard deviations
(SD), and then on test scores of students belonging to the two social background categories.
The picture that emerges from these results is that students with higher social background seem to
be more susceptible to changes in local autonomy: they gain more in high-developed cities and they
lose more in low-developed ones, with respect to lower social background students.
7 Channels
7.1 Expenditure on education
In the pursuit of the reasons behind heterogeneous educational outcomes between high-developed
and low-developed autonomous cities, the perhaps most straightforward starting point is expen-
37Reason for the smaller sample sizes on the mother education (ME) specifications, with respect to the standard
deviation (SD) specifications.
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Table 8: Effect of local autonomy on score dispersion and by social background
(a) Mathematics
Bottom 25% cities Top 25% cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
score SD Low ME High ME score SD Low ME High ME
Certified -0.45∗ -1.56 -3.05∗ 0.43∗ 2.28∗∗ 2.76∗∗∗
(0.24) (1.26) (1.80) (0.23) (0.97) (0.91)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6,524 4,128 3,932 275 175 175
R-sq. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 0.046 0.029
(b) Spanish Language
Bottom 25% cities Top 25% cities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
score SD Low ME High ME score SD Low ME High ME
Certified -0.13 -1.34 -2.85∗∗ 0.02 1.47 1.66∗
(0.15) (1.06) (1.40) (0.23) (1.19) (0.88)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6,524 4,128 3,932 275 175 175
R-sq. 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.033 0.035
diture choices. Using detailed balance sheet data38 of municipalities in the highest and lowest
development quartiles, in Table 9 I perform t-tests on the mean expenditures of the two groups
over the post-reform period 2002-2012. Central government transfers that municipalities receive to
finance education services (SGP Educación) are also compared, as well as the resulting difference
between spending and transfers. Recall that spending on education exceeding government transfers
is covered by municipalities using their own resources, which are represented mainly by local tax
and fees collection, and by capital gains39.
What emerges from the comparisons performed in Table 9 is that the average per-pupil expendi-
38“Ejecuciones municipales, formato largo”. Reported yearly by municipalities to the government agency DNP
(Departamento Nacional de Planeación). Source: Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá, 2015.
39Examples of local tax and fees are the housing and land ownership tax, tax on gasoline consumption, traffic
fines. Examples of capital gains are interests on municipal accounts and rents from municipal-owned infrastructure
and land.
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ture by municipalities in the highest development quartile is almost 23% higher than the one of
municipalities in the lowest development quartile. Within education expenditure, the difference on
personnel salaries is around 13%, up to 30% on school infrastructure and material and as much as
63% higher on other education expenses and programs40. The asymmetry in spending is not matched
by any asymmetry in central government resources received. In fact, while the low-developed group
appears to be spending on education barely as much as it receives in education transfers, the high-
developed group is integrating transfers with own resources, for around 12% of their total education
spending41. The differences in spending behavior uncovered through analysis of municipal balance
data provides at least suggestive evidence towards the explanation of student test score dynamics
previously identified.
Table 9: Per-pupil expenditure and transfers received
All certified Low 25% High 25% ∆ H - L ∆%
A) Education spending 1160.58 1021.83 1282.54 260.71*** 22.66%
(402.76) (406.27) (438.28) (81.28)
- Salaries 930.44 836.58 954.25 117.67** 13.14%
(302.62) (319.52) (280.06) (58.12)
- Infrastr. and material 98.46 103.95 140.94 37.00* 30.21%
(90.20) (93.11) (132.88) (21.90)
- Others 82.65 52.65 100.82 48.17*** 62.77%
(93.85) (73.70) (97.78) (16.56)
B) Education transfers 1153.41 1114.91 1134.53 19.61 1.74%
(415.96) (383.34) (319.94) (57.13)
A) - B) 7.17 –93.08 148.01**
(34.23) (66.73) (54.26)
N.obs (expenditure) 240 56 50 106
N.obs (transfers) 345 88 70 158
N. municipalities 35 9 7 16
Table of mean annual per-pupil expenditures and central government transfers received (2002-2012,
in thousands of Colombian pesos) and t-tests on the mean differences. Standard deviations in
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
40Examples of the most frequent balance sheet items in this category are school transport, teacher formation, plan-
ning and development of school information systems, investments in efficiency of the municipal education management
authority, contracts with private institutions for additional education services.
41Table 15 in the Appendix shows that municipalities in the higher developed group have been enjoying higher
availability of own resources both before and after the reform. The resource gap between the two groups has been
significantly narrowed in post-reform years, mainly through compensatory transfers from the central government.
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7.2 Administration indicators
Table 10 summarizes data on municipal evaluation processes that are carried out by the government
on a yearly basis42. The ‘Legal compliance rate’ (Índice de Cumplimiento de Requisitos Legales)
indicates the extent to which the municipality administration is found to adhere to the national
norms in its use of government transfers, in all sectors of activity. The frequency of detection of
accounting irregularities and illicit use of funds determine the rating received through this index
[DNP, 2014]. The ‘Managerial capabilities index’ (Índice de Capacidad Administrativa) measures
the extent to which the municipal administration appears suitable and prepared to perform its
tasks thoroughly and to promote local development. The elements factoring into the index are
the stability of managerial employees, the level of competency of clerks, the availability of suitable
IT equipment and the level of automation of administrative processes [DNP, 2011]. The takeaway
from Table 10 is that there are significant differences in these administration quality indicators
between high-developed and low-developed municipalities, in the direction one would expect. This
holds true for both municipalities that were certified (panel a) ) and for smaller municipalities
(panel b) ). Adding to the evidence on expenditure behavior, the striking differences in these
quality indicators provide further suggestive evidence towards the channels through which test score
dynamics may have come about. Municipalities in the high-development range, characterized by
higher availability of financial resources and a more pro-education spending policy, along with higher
quality administration capabilities, were able to improve education quality on their territories with
respect to the centralized management. The opposite has been true for cities in the low-development
range, with fewer local resources and worse management skills.
7.3 Oaxaca decomposition of test score differences
Having documented the existence of significant differences in education expenditure and adminis-
tration indices between highly developed and low developed municipalities, it is desirable to gauge
the extent to which such differences are able to explain the gap in student performance between
the two groups of cities. Table 11 shows the results of the decomposition technique proposed by
Oaxaca [1973] and Blinder [1973], which splits test score gaps into explained and unexplained com-
ponents43. The results show that around one third of the gap is attributable to raw differences in
42DNP-DDTS (Departamento Nacional de Planeación - Dirección de Desarrollo Territorial Sostenible) is the gov-
ernment agency in charge of the study.
43This is sometimes known as the ‘twofold’ decomposition approach. See the excellent illustration by Jann [2008]
for reference. The baseline coefficient vector is obtained by regressing student test scores on per-pupil expenditure,
the two administration quality indices and the third-degree population polynomial on the sample of all certified
cities. Baseline coefficients are then used to analyze the score differential betwen cities in the highest and the lowest
development quartile. The differential is decomposed into a part that is explained by group differences in predictors
(“Explained” component, or “quantity effect”), and a part that is attributed to different returns to predictors across
the two groups (“Unexplained” component).
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Table 10: Municipal administration indices
a) Certified municipalities All certified Low 25% High 25% ∆ H - L
Managerial capabilities 67.99 46.01 79.12 33.11***
(25.08) (26.84) (16.77) (4.38)
Compliance rate 77.87 69.74 79.18 9.43*
(22.95) (29.45) (21.50) (5.01)
N.obs 245 63 49 112
N. municipalities 9 7 16
b) All municipalities All Low 25% High 25% ∆ H - L
Managerial capabilities 63.67 61.98 80.39 18.41***
(25.25) (25.56) (17.39) (1.99)
Compliance rate 74.65 73.73 83.35 9.6***
(22.23) (22.66) (16.52) (1.77)
N.obs 4841 4187 168 4355
N. municipalities
Table of evaluation indices (mean 2005-2012, scales 1-100) and t-tests on the mean differences.
Standard deviations in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
expenditure and administration quality, with the latter playing the by far larger role. According
to this decomposition, if highly developed cities recorded the same per-pupil education expenditure
and the same administration quality indices as we find among low developed cities, their average
test score performances would have been one point (or 10% of a student standard deviation) lower.
Differences in expenditure quantities and administration indices do not directly account for the
remaining two thirds of the test score gap: it is returns to expenditure and especially to adminis-
tration capacity that appear to differ significantly between highly- and low developed cities. These
differences in returns are likely to capture differences between the two groups of cities which are not
currently being accounted for.
8 Conclusion
In this paper I have taken advantage of an unusually favorable reform setting to show that cities
characterized by different levels of local development have reacted differently to higher autonomy
over the public education service. Levels of municipal development embody the wealth of local
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Table 11: Oaxaca decomposition of test score differences
Mathematics Spanish Language
2005 2007 2010 2005 2007 2010
Differential
Prediction Low dev. 42.067∗∗∗ 41.959∗∗∗ 41.665∗∗∗ 43.484∗∗∗ 43.659∗∗∗ 43.057∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.46) (0.64) (0.37) (0.36) (0.45)
Prediction High dev. 45.600∗∗∗ 45.813∗∗∗ 46.621∗∗∗ 47.166∗∗∗ 47.250∗∗∗ 47.499∗∗∗
(0.46) (0.49) (0.63) (0.40) (0.41) (0.46)
Difference -3.533∗∗∗ -3.854∗∗∗ -4.956∗∗∗ -3.682∗∗∗ -3.591∗∗∗ -4.442∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.68) (0.90) (0.55) (0.54) (0.65)
Explained
Expenditure -0.174 -0.181 -0.180 -0.069 -0.045 -0.093
(0.15) (0.17) (0.24) (0.11) (0.13) (0.19)
Admin. capacity -0.827∗∗∗ -0.922∗∗∗ -1.377∗∗ -0.553∗∗∗ -0.558∗∗ -1.040∗∗
(0.28) (0.33) (0.62) (0.21) (0.23) (0.42)
Legal requirements -0.037 -0.032 -0.008 -0.057 -0.041 -0.001
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total -1.010∗∗ -1.094∗∗ -1.697∗∗ -0.997∗∗ -0.966∗∗ -1.564∗∗∗
(0.42) (0.49) (0.77) (0.39) (0.38) (0.56)
Unexplained
Expenditure -0.950 -0.205 2.139 1.520∗∗ 1.920 3.300∗
(0.84) (0.79) (1.65) (0.72) (1.34) (1.85)
Admin. capacity -2.564∗∗ -2.491∗∗ -4.728∗∗∗ -2.907∗∗∗ -2.803∗∗∗ -4.120∗∗∗
(1.08) (1.17) (1.48) (0.91) (1.04) (1.35)
Legal requirements -0.401 -0.370 0.562 -0.284 -0.100 0.709
(0.68) (0.83) (1.49) (0.54) (0.50) (1.04)
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Total -2.522∗∗∗ -2.760∗∗∗ -3.259∗∗∗ -2.685∗∗∗ -2.625∗∗∗ -2.878∗∗∗
(0.62) (0.69) (0.98) (0.57) (0.56) (0.73)
N 110 94 47 110 94 47
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of test score gaps between highly and low developed municipalities,
into explained and unexplained components. Columns indicate time periods from 2005, 2007 and
2010 onwards respectively. All models include population controls (third degree polynomial).
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
population and the amounts of own financial resources available. In the ten years following the
handover of responsibilities, cities in the highest development quartile have significantly improved
their student’s test score performance with respect to non-autonomous counterparts; cities in the
lowest development quartile instead display the opposite test score trend. The test score gaps are
growing stronger over time. The high-developed group of cities invests in education more than the ad
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hoc financial transfers it receives from the central government, while cities in the lowest development
quartile barely invest their financial allocation. The largest differences in investment shares between
the two groups are on “other education programs”, which include teacher formation, school transport,
planning and maintenance of school information systems and investments into the efficiency of
the local education authority itself. Spending differences are also found on the infrastructure and
school material investments, and on school staff. Moreover, high developed municipalities perform
significantly better on different administration quality indicators with respect to low developed cities,
which suggests additional explanations for why, once given autonomy on the delivery of the public
service, their results have started drifting apart.
The findings of this study sound a note of caution in the design of decentralization reforms in
contexts in which subnational heterogeneity in wealth and development is an issue. When handing
responsibilities in public service delivery to the local level, less advantaged localities may need
additional training and support in order to avoid regional inequality to grow, and decentralization
to backfire for segments of the population.
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Appendix
A Maps
a) b)
c) d)
a) Colombia’s departments; b) Colombia’s municipalities; c) Municipalities which were certified in
education in 2002 (in black); d) Distribution of Municipal Development Index in 2001. In maps c) and
d) the rural south-east is omitted to allow larger zoom on the densely populated area.
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B Population and Municipal Development Index distributions
Figure 5 shows the distributions of the municipal development measures by certification status.
Figure 6 extends Figure 1, illustrating population and MDI distributions for a wider range of mu-
nicipalities.
Figure 5: Distribution of MDI by certification
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Figure 6: Population and MDI distributions
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C Smoothness checks
Figure 7: Smoothness of municipal characteristics across the discontinuity
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D Common pre-reform trend and falsification test
In order to dissolve residual doubts about whether municipalities on the two sides of the certification
cutoff may have been evolving in different ways over time also in absence of the reform, I perform
a test on the pre-reform trend. Lamentably the available pre-reform years of test score data are
only two (2000 and 2001), thus the test will look at the changes between those two years only: the
variable ∆Y = Y2001 − Y2000 is the outcome variable in panel (a) of Table 12. No discontinuities
nor patterns are discovered in the results, neither across the four development subsamples nor
through the interaction term specification, confirming our belief that cities above and below the
treatment cutoff are not intrinsically different from each other. Panel (b) of the same table shows
the results of the RD estimation on pre-reform data, in order to verify that the test score patterns and
discontinuities identified in the main results were not already existing before the treatment. Again
the subsample analysis does not reveal any particular relationship between scores and development
before autonomy, while the interaction term specification does show a pattern qualitatively similar to
the post-reform scenario but significantly weaker in magnitude. The overall conclusion I draw from
the two panels of Table 12 is that before the 2001 decentralization reform, among municipalities sized
around 100thousand inhabitants, there was no evident relationship between development measures
and student test scores levels or growth rates. That relationship emerged only once cities were
endowed with decisional and financial autonomy over the public education service.
E Progress over time using time bins
Expanding on Section 6.1.2, here I provide a different approach to the analysis of over-time behavior
of the certification effect. Instead of looking at progressively later time periods as done in Table
4, Table 13 and Figure 8 show results of RD estimations performed on successive and mutually
exclusive 3-year bins. Standard errors are larger with respect to the previous approach, as fewer
data points enter each bin; the result patterns remain the same and average effects can be observed
growing over time.
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Table 13: Certification on Saber 11 test scores - progress over time
[ Regression Discontinuity Estimation ]
(a) Top 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2010 2011-2012 2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2010 2011-2012
Certified 1.591∗∗ 1.456∗ 2.209∗∗ 4.222∗∗ 2.642 1.331 1.134 2.294
(0.77) (0.83) (0.86) (1.69) (1.57) (1.15) (0.85) (1.41)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 75 75 75 50 75 75 75 50
R-sq. 0.072 0.119 0.134 0.260 0.054 0.075 0.143 0.164
(b) Bottom 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2010 2011-2012 2002-2004 2005-2007 2008-2010 2011-2012
Certified -0.714 -0.820 -1.940 -3.350∗∗ -1.523 -1.404 -1.412 -2.195∗
(0.52) (0.85) (1.31) (1.66) (1.04) (1.13) (0.89) (1.33)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,731 1,796 1,803 1,206 1,731 1,796 1,803 1,206
R-sq. 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.008
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses
* p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
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Figure 8: Effect of certification over time
[ Regression Discontinuity Estimation ]
RD estimations of the effect of certification on average Math test scores, for certified municipalities in the top 25%
and the bottom 25% development range (triangles and circles series respectively). Capped spikes indicate 95%
confidence intervals on point estimates.
F Testing the difference between pre- and post-reform coefficients
In this section I formally test the difference between the RD coefficient estimates obtained using
post-reform data (Section 6.1) and the ‘falsification’ coefficients obtained using pre-reform data
(Section D), for both the high and the low development groups. Table 14 shows difference estimates
and the associated standard errors. Focusing on mathematics test scores, for high-developed cities
the differences between pre-and post-reform coefficients are statistically significant on every time
span considered. For the low-developed group instead, statistical difference is reached only once we
look further away from the reform date, at the years 2010-2012, suggesting a slower emergence of
the reform effects on this group. Coefficients on language scores do not reach statistically significant
differences between pre- and post-reform years.
G Financial resources of municipalities
In Table 15 I show how the level of local development embodies significant differences in the amount
of financial resources available to the municipal administration of autonomous cities. Central govern-
ment transfers do implement some redistribution, but differences in local tax collection and capital
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Table 14: Differences between pre-and post-reform coefficients
Mathematics Spanish Language
Post 02 Post 04 Post 07 Post 10 | Post 02 Post 04 Post 07 Post 10
a) Top 25% 1.72* 1.89* 2.52** 3.32** 1.53 1.36 1.08 1.64
(0.87) (0.93) (1.08) (1.51) (0.94) (0.88) (0.84) (1.12)
b) Bottom 25% –1.05 –1.27 –1.70 –2.64* –0.95 –0.86 –1.00 –1.42
(0.98) (1.11) (1.29) (1.59) (0.99) (1.00) (1.05) (1.11)
N a) 325 275 200 125 325 275 200 125
N.mun. a) 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
N b) 7,713 6,521 4,786 2,986 7,713 6,521 4,786 2,986
N.mun. b) 603 602 603 603 603 602 603 603
Table of differences between pre-reform and post-reform coefficients of certification on student test
scores. Standard errors on differences in parentheses. Pre-reform coefficients are obtained estimat-
ing RD model (1) on 2000-2001 student test scores. Post reform coefficients are obtained estimating
RD model (1) respectively on 2000-2012, 2004-2012, 2007-2012 and 2010-2012 student test scores. *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
gains sustain the advantage of high-developed cities with respect to low-developed ones.
Table 15: Percapita resources of certified municipalities in bottom and top development quartile
Pre-reform (1998-2001) Post-reform (2002-2012)
Low 25% High 25% ∆% Low 25% High 25% ∆%
Total 154.63 343.71 75.88%*** 638.61 716.24 11.46%*
(41.68) (122.75) (280.38) (250.99)
Transfers 113.72 82.08 –32.32%** 480.20 260.36 –59.37%***
(40.33) (30.98) (208.34) (88.40)
Tax collection 24.38 158.77 146.77%*** 54.33 254.57 129.65%***
(13.72) (73.18) (28.34) (117.02)
Capital gains 10.23 29.76 97.67%*** 83.11 138.39 49.91%***
(12.48) (19.35) (91.60) (87.31)
N.obs 23 14 37 90 64 154
N. municipalities 8 7 15 9 7 16
Table of mean annual percapita resources reported by municipalities in pre- and post-reform years
(in thousands of Colombian pesos), and percentage differences between the two groups. Stan-
dard deviations in parentheses. Significance stars refer to t-tests on the mean differences, *
p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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H Descriptive evolution of test scores
Table 16 illustrates test score differences between highly developed (first quartile) and low developed
(last quartile) municipalities, at several points in time, for both Mathematics and Spanish language.
Differences are indicated separately for the group of cities that obtained certification in 2002 and for
the group that did not. In both groups, highly developed cities always see higher test scores than
low developed ones, even before the decentralization reform. Nevertheless we can observe that for
cities that obtained autonomy in 2002, the test score gap between high and low developed members
increases in the post-reform period significantly more than what it does in the never-autonomous
group of cities. These are descriptive patterns that do not represent estimations of the causal effects
of the 2002 reform (refer to the main results for such estimations): instead they inform us about the
bare over-time evolution of student performance in one group of cities relative to the other.
Table 16: Over time evolution in test score differences
Pre 2002 Post 2002 Post 2004 Post 2007 Post 2010
A) Mathematics
A1. Cities certified in 2002 1.09*** 2.83*** 3.16*** 3.79*** 4.81***
(0.28) (.62) (.68) (.82) (1.11)
A2. Cities not certified in 2002 0.01 1.40*** 1.52*** 2.02*** 2.74***
(.12) (.23) (.25) (.29) (.37)
A1. - A2. 1.08*** 1.43** 1.63** 1.77** 2.07*
(.31) (.65) (.71) (.87) (1.16)
B) Language
B1. Cities certified in 2002 2.50*** 3.32*** 3.33*** 3.45*** 4.29***
(.62) (3.32) (.70) (.68) (.84)
B2. Cities not certified in 2002 1.61*** 2.05*** 2.00*** 1.96*** 2.64***
(.30) (.25) (.24) (.24) (.30)
B1. - B2. 0.89 1.28* 1.32* 1.49** 1.65*
(.69) (.75) (.74) (.72) (.88)
N.obs 1,227 6,811 5,569 3,759 1,884
N. municipalities 621 628 628 628 628
Table of differences in test scores between cities in the highest and in the lowest development
quartile, all conditional on population (third-degree polynomial). Differences are indicated at
progressive points in time, and separately for cities certified in 2002 (rows A1. and B1.) and
for cities not certified in 2002 (rows A2. and B2.). Standard errors clustered by municipality in
parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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I Robustness checks
I.1 Regression Discontinuity Estimation
I.1.1 Different polynomials at each side of the cutoff
Table 17 replicates the results shown in Table 3, now allowing for a different polynomial on each side
of the certification cutoff. In econometric terms, this table shows the results of fitting the models Yi =
α+τRDCi+βDi+f(Pi)+f(Pi)×Ci+ǫi and Yi = α+τ
RD
0 Ci+τ
RD
1 Ci∗Di+βDi+f(Pi)+f(Pi)×Ci+ǫi,
where f(Pi) is a third-order polynomial of population Pi. The results from the main section are
robust to these alternative model specifications.
I.1.2 Correction of statistical significance for multiple testing
If one considers columns (2) to (5) in Table 3 to be testing four separate hypotheses that are
related to each other in unknown ways, the α levels used as benchmarks should be appropriately
adjusted. Table 18 reports the results for municipalities in the highest and lowest development
quartile, with significance stars corrected for multiple testing according to the method illustrated
by Simes [1986]. Let p(1), p(2), p(3), p(4) be the p-values, ordered from smallest to largest, for testing
hypotheses H0 = {H1, H2, H3, H4}, each corresponding to one of the four development categories
used. Then each H(j) is rejected if p(j) ≤ jα/n for any j = 1..4, and H0 is rejected if all H(j) are
rejected.
I.2 Difference-in-Differences Estimation
I.2.1 Different cutoffs for the discontinuity sample
Table 19 shows the results of Table 5 employing different choices of the discontinuity-sample.
Columns (4) to (8) correspond to the same sample as used for the RD estimation.
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Table 17: Certification on Saber 11 test scores - by Municipal Development Index ‘01 (2 polynomials)
(a) Mathematics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Bottom 25% Bottom 50% Top 50% Top 25% Interaction
Certified 0.176 -2.259∗ 1.211 -0.307 3.065∗∗∗ -2.267∗∗
(1.12) (1.37) (1.60) (1.27) (0.81) (0.88)
Certif.*MDI’01 perc. 0.038∗∗∗
(0.01)
MDI’01 percentile 0.023∗∗∗
(0.00)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,572 6,536 7,100 472 275 7,561
R-sq. 0.013 0.003 0.004 0.028 0.073 0.084
(b) Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Bottom 25% Bottom 50% Top 50% Top 25% Interaction
Certified 0.072 -3.602∗∗∗ 1.274 -0.432 2.379∗∗ -2.043∗∗
(1.14) (1.31) (1.60) (1.18) (1.10) (0.96)
Certif.*MDI’01 perc. 0.035∗∗∗
(0.01)
MDI’01 percentile 0.031∗∗∗
(0.00)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,572 6,536 7,100 472 275 7,561
R-sq. 0.018 0.003 0.004 0.029 0.073 0.124
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. * p<.10 ** p<.05 *** p<.01
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Table 18: Certification on Saber 11 test scores - Significance corrected for multiple testing
(a) Top 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post ‘02 Post ‘04 Post ‘07 Post ‘10 Post ‘02 Post ‘04 Post ‘07 Post ‘10
Certified 2.20* 2.37* 3.00** 3.80* 1.81 1.64 1.36 1.92
(0.86) (0.92) (1.06) (1.52) (1.14) (1.09) (1.04) (1.29)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 275 225 150 75 275 225 150 75
R-sq. 0.050 0.069 0.137 0.199 0.035 0.038 0.126 0.137
(b) Bottom 25% MDI ‘01
Mathematics Spanish Language
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Post ‘02 Post ‘04 Post ‘07 Post ‘10 Post ‘02 Post ‘04 Post ‘07 Post ‘10
Certified –1.58 –1.80 –2.23 –3.17 –1.55 –1.47 –1.61 –2.03
(0.99) (1.12) (1.29) (1.60) (1.00) (1.02) (1.06) (1.12)
.
F(Population) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6,536 5,344 3,609 1,809 6,536 5,344 3,609 1,809
R-sq. 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.007
Effect of certification on student test scores. with significance stars corrected for multiple testing ac-
cording to the Simes (1986) method. * p(j)<j0.10/4, ** p(j)<j0.05/4, *** p(j)<j0.01/4, for any
j=1,2,3,4 of the ordered p-values.
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Table 19: Different cutoffs for the discontinutiy sample (FE)
50,000 - 250,000 10,000 - 500,000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Mate Mate Lang Lang Mate Mate Lang Lang
Certified 0.526 –3.210*** 0.240 –1.346*** 0.775***–2.778*** 0.264** –1.232**
(0.35) (0.91) (0.18) (0.50) (0.22) (0.80) (0.13) (0.48)
Certified * MDI ‘01 0.077*** 0.032*** 0.070*** 0.029***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
.
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,227 1,214 1,227 1,214 8,938 8,925 8,938 8,925
N groups 95 94 95 94 698 697 698 697
R-sq. 0.60 0.61 0.71 0.71 0.42 0.42 0.62 0.62
Standard errors clustered by municipality in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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